More Preparations for deployment

I received some notes from a 155th officer already deployed to Iraq. I’ve included them here:

Iraqi Notes



Sir,



Below are some notes on what I have observed on the process of mobilization. I hope this helps.



S-4. This will be the most important person as you prepare to mobilize and he will be critical until you finish Transfer of Authority. There are extreme challenges that will be faced by the Brigade. The load plans you have now are not worth spit. By the time you get here, you will fall in on the majority of your combat equipment. However, getting all of the conexes loaded and shipped will be a bear.

I feel that the Bde S-4 and Bn S-4s with their NCOs need to get with 3rd ID ASAP and watch the process.

S-5 and IO. These staff slots are your bread and butter. The better you get the word to the locals out, the fewer soldiers you will have engaged. I think Danny Blanton will do well. You need a strong S-5. The majority of the missions conducted here are Battalion, Company and Platoon. I think the S-5 slot will be more important than the S-3.

S-2. The majority of intel is a bottom up type of intel. In that, I mean that your Bde S-2 gets most of his intel from the battalions as a result of their patrol debriefings. You need really strong Bn S-2’s.

LNO. Do not put a weak officer in this position. You need someone who will make decisions for you. It has to be a stud captain.

CSM. Sir, gone are the days of a CSM being worried about police call. You need someone who will ride the NCOs hard, especially on uniform standards and on the complaining part. You do not need a good ole boy in this slot.

JAG. All soldiers and leaders need good briefing on UCMJ. This needs to be done up front. Leaders need to know what their options are. The majority of discipline problems will come up within the first month or so of mobilization. If commanders can strike hard and fast, I think you will see big results. Otherwise, you will see a lot of congressionals and IG complaints. 39th BCT has two congressionals ongoing now, and both are ridiculous.

Uniforms and patches. Sir, the biggest mistake, in my opinion, is the refusal of the 39th BCT to take off its patch and wear the 1CD patch. When soldiers in 1CD see the Bowie patch, the automatically label the soldier wearing the patch as a dirtbag. Unfair, but true. Uniforms. My god, what a bunch of National Guardsmen! Some didn’t need to be wearing the patch for you to tell. Get the companies to start getting the soldiers new uniforms now. You will probably wear BDUs for quite some time. Also, and this is one reason for a strong CSM, haircuts and mustaches are a big source of my personal disgust for the 39th.

Movement planning. This goes back to my S-4 comments. DOL may help some, but the Brigade needs to fend for itself. Most of the 1CD Transportation Office had to help out the 39th. It labeled them as a bunch of morons. Truth is, they just were not trained. CPT Robert Lewis is one of the best Logisticians I have ever worked with. He saved my butt in Bosnia. You need a 90A qualified officer in the S-4 shop.

Information flow. This was the biggest sore spot with the 39th BCT. The leaders were not telling the soldiers what the big picture looked like. Soldiers were guessing. This led to much heartache.

Family members. As you know, Family Support Groups are crucial. I do not think the 39th started on this soon enough. There were way too many families at Ft. Hood during key training for the BCT. This was a huge distractor. My recommendation is to announce passes or any type of downtime in advance. This should help keep the flow of unannounced family visits to a minimum. I even heard a couple of soldiers say that they could have family members visit whenever they wanted, and screw the training.

Training. You will have more help than you want on the big training events. It will be the individual training that will bite you. Crew-served gunnery was totally screwed up in 39th. They did not do what they were supposed to as far as assistant gunners and night qualification. They had to spend a great deal of time on the ranges rectifying this.

Snipers. Get as many soldiers as you can to sniper school!!!!! As bad as things have been here, they would be a lot worse had it not been for the snipers. 1CD screwed up and did not train enough of them. Just because a soldier can hit a deer at 600 yards, does not make him a sniper. Fight for the slots. My opinion, you need at least one per company.

Combat Lifesavers. I think the DA standard is 10%. In 1CD, it is one per patrol. If I were one of your battalion commanders, I would try to get 100% in CLS. As you know from your last war, the first couple of minutes are crucial. Also, we are using Israeli bandages rather than the Army-issued bandages. They work much better. Also, each medic needs a Special Forces tourniquet. We have had a couple of soldiers bleed out for lack of a good tourniquet.


Sir, this ends my litany for now. I will provide as detailed of information as you want. Or, I will shut up and leave you alone if you want. It’s just that I want to help out as much as I can. In my opinion, the 39th BCT is a great organization and it has great soldiers. The Bde leadership though, is a bunch of good ole boys. The Bde Cdr, DCO, and XO are three of the biggest morons I have ever seen.



Lee





I also received COL Oliver’s assessment of our IDT Training just past:

From: Oliver, James E. LTC [mailto:james.oliver@ms.ngb.army.mil]

Sent: Wednesday, May 19, 2004 1:49 PM

To: CPT Scott Caldwell A / 2-198; CPT Jacque Byrd, B/2-198; 1LT Dirk Waldrop, C/2-198; CPT East, HHC, 2-198

Cc: 'DavisG@gsci.state.ms.us'; MAJ Jason Marlar; Honeycutt, Michael A. CPT; McClendon, Robert J CPT; Dubose, Floyd J. MSG; CPT George W. Vinzant

(gvinzant@olemiss.edu)

Subject: Cdr's Assessment - May IDT







Commanders / Leaders / Staff, below is my assessment and observations of the IDT conducted at Cp McCain 14-16 May 04. I will discuss these observations with each commander and the command group separately during the June IDT. I am sending you this assessment so you will have an understanding of what I view as observed shortcomings that we should be focusing on in the future and in establishing your training plans for AT04 and beyond. The priorities for AT04 are (1) Personnel Readiness (2) Equipment Readiness and (3) Training Readiness in that order. However, this will serve to give you an idea of my observations on training and operation and how we will conduct business in the future.







1. A. PROBLEM - COMMUNICATIIONS: The ability and effectiveness of the

battalion to function was seriously degraded due to the inability to have all radios/nets operational from the moment the units arrived at the training site. I observed an M1A1 Tank Battalion reduced to the level of C2 on par with an infantry regiment circa 1917. The standard method of communications with key leaders during operations this IDT was by courier. Leaders would have to literally "drive over to the assembly area to tell

CPT X to get ready to start his lane" .







1. B. SOLUTION: I consider the inability to communicate with

everyone a war-stopper. If a vehicle has a radio and that vehicle cannot communicate then all available assets and resources should be directed to get that vehicle on the net. Every tank, hummer, M577. M113, etc. This is an essential task for the ADVON during IDT and will be a priority task for training in all units down to the vehicle level during each operation. I want each net opened formally IAW established SOP and doctrine and our C3I capability formally tracked by the TOC. Everyone must understand that this is a CCIR at all times whether we are conducting lanes training or any other operation. I want the following actions to be put in place now to get us on the road to a fix for this problem: (1) SINCGARS "how to" cards attached to the radio mounts or taped to the windshield of every vehicle and posted in the CPs so the operator has a checklist of how to load and operate a SINCGARS radio. (2) The TOC will formally open and close the Bn nets and track every station formally during every future operation. (3) An OE-254 will be erected at every CP (TOC, CTCP, FTCP and UMCP) every time we deploy to a field environment. If a HQs is established such as was done using S207 then an OE-254 will be set up there with a radio as well. (4) Net calls will be made per TACSOP and will be done in sequence and to standard. (5) RETRANS

teams will be established and trained during IDT and AT04.







2. A. PROBLEM - TIMELINE / TIME MANAGEMENT: The ability of sections,

platoons and companies to set and meet timelines was poor. Units failed to meet established SP times, LD times and failed to adhere to the training timeline. This caused soldier's times to be wasted and is indicative of poor discipline and leadership.







3. B. SOLUTION: We will set a timeline in each MOI for every lane. I

want each platoon or company lane to have a timeline and the leaders will ruthlessly enforce that timeline 100% of the time. Only me, the XO or the S3 will change a timeline or move a units SP or LD time for example. Co Commanders do not have an option to decide whether to move the SP time or not. Ever. The TOC (Battle CPT) will post and track all training and operational timelines. Commanders should consider the inability to adhere to a timeline or miss an SP or LD a capital offense. The Staff should consider the inability to manage and set timelines a capital offense as well. I want to be informed by the staff of any unit that is not expected to meet a timeline or miss a key event on a timeline such as an SP, LD, rehearsal, etc .







4. A. PROBLEM - PCC / PCI: I saw tanks run out of fuel on the lane and

a company commander miss a timeline (SP) because he had to fuel his tank while the rest of his unit was lined up and ready to execute SP. I consider it a criminal offense to run out of fuel. Can anyone imagine the implications of a tank or truck or hummer running out of fuel in the middle of Najaf or Karbala? What excuse would the commander write in his letter to the parents or wife of the soldiers that died because they were ambushed on the side of the road waiting for the fuel truck or recovery vehicle to find them at night? "Your son died because I did not have my leaders conduct a PCC or I didn't conduct a PCI or I didn't require the TCs to fuel their vehicles because they were tired" ?







4. B. SOLUTION: The S3 is developing a standard, approved PCI checklist

for every section/plt that is on the 2-198 battle roster. If a checklist already exists, then the S3 will review and approve that checklist. These checklists will then be added to each SOP and will be placed in the leader book of every NCO and officer in this battalion. PCC / PCI will be placed on training and operational timelines and the 2-198 Command Group will form into PCI teams and personally conduct PCIs in the future. A policy is forthcoming that mandates disciplinary action on any TC/Vehicle Commander if that vehicle runs out of fuel in the future. I want to review these recommended PCC / PCI Checklists during the June IDT as well as the policy letter on fuel.







5. A. PROBLEM - REPORTING / TRACKING: Tracking of LOGSTAT and Slant

was poor due to unfamiliarity of the format, communication problems, no XO in the company, no method to track in the CP, etc, etc.







5. B. SOLUTION: The Bn XO will confirm all CP tracking charts and

formats NLT June IDT. This will include cross check with 155 Bde Charts and distribute to all staff sections. XO will also review and 2-198 TACSOP for compliance with 155 and insure that the S1/S4 has access to the automated CSS programs available on the LEW and new developments using JDLM. POC for this is 155 S1/S4 or Mr. Steve McFeeters. The XO and CSM are the primary CSS trainers and will establish and monitor specific Staff/CP training for AT04. Input from the XO and CSM is due to 2-198 S3 Air prior to June IDT. Co Commanders should be the first line effort in recruiting a company XO from past contacts and associations or the list I sent yesterday. Additionally, commanders should begin training the 1SG to assume those duties until an XO is available .







6. A. PROBLEM - Soldier's Time Wasted: Due to problems discussed with

communications and timelines above, there were blocks of time where soldiers were waiting on leaders to develop a plan for training. Examples of this include the last minute search for OPFOR crews, Timelines developed by the Mortar platoon leader at the training location, misuse of PCC / PCI times, poor management of the time in the CPs. Our soldiers gave a full measure of effort this weekend as shown by individual and collective effort on the lanes and in other training. We owe them the best possible use of available time to insure they are adequately prepared for the tasks ahead. More detailed review and planning is required in MOIs and IPRs.







6. B. SOLUTION: The S3/AO will establish as SOP a schedule of Bi-monthly

full time coordination meetings to review the IDT coordination plan, AT04 plan, Mobilization Prep and any other key events planned in a 90 day period. The 155 Staff Event List will be used as a model format to establish a FT Staff Planning Calendar for 2-198 and to schedule all bi-monthly meetings. This meeting every 2 weeks will be posted and all key leaders notified so attendance can be planned for traditional leaders and staff as their schedule will allow.







7. Summary : I understand the shortcomings experienced by the unit in

such areas as shortage of key leaders (Co XOs), inexperience, bad weather, lack of training time, etc. These are all obstacles to overcome that cannot deter us from correcting these problems. My comments above, as all my assessments will be, are not directed at any single individual or unit but simply serve as a direction to get us where we must be. I will measure the readiness and capabilities of the sections, platoons and companies of this battalion based on "little things". Remember, the devil is in the details. Can a unit move and occupy terrain at the right time and place, can sergeants execute a PCC / PCI to standard, are all 5988Es complete to standard, can we communicate with everyone, Do leaders have a map and overlay, is headspace and timing set on every .50 Cal., does the M88 crew have the right frequency set and can the TC read a map, are spare NVG batteries available, ? As I said Sunday, I must know your commitment to the challenge. I received everyone's acknowledgement to that commitment. We do not have the time to delay. I believe our mobilization will occur before August, probably in July. Based on info received this week it looks like 2 tank battalions will be included on the 155 MTOE. One of these battalions will be composed of one mech company, one tank company and one motorized (HMMWV)company. The other battalion will be composed of 3 pure, HMMWV based motorized companies. No decision has been made on which battalion is organized with mech/tank/HMMWV companies or will organize as a pure motorized, HMMWV based battalion. Regardless, our tasks remain unchanged. Communicate with your units daily and get personally involved and informed in the details of your section, platoons and companies in the areas of (1) Personnel Readiness, (2) Logistics/Equipment Readiness and (3) Training

Readiness. Pass this assessment on to your key leaders.







LTC Oliver