Today I downloaded the following description of the 155 SAB from the web:
(Separate) (Heavy) "Dixie Thunder"
The 155th separate Armored Brigade (Heavy) takes it’s name from the 155th Infantry Regiment which dates back to 1798.
During its history, the 155th Infantry has served under such notable leaders as Andrew Jackson and Jefferson Davis, and participated in the battles of the War of 1812, the United States Civil War, the Spanish American War, World War One and Two, and mobilized for Desert Shield/Storm.
While the units assigned to the 155th Armored Brigade vary in length of service, the brigade itself dates back to April 1951 when it was organized as Headquarters, Company 108th Armored Cavalry Regiment. In 1968 the 108th became part of the 30th Armored Division and re-designated as the First Brigade, 30th Armored Division.
In 1973 the brigade was redesignated as the 155th Armored Brigade when the 30th Amored Division was broken up into separate brigades.
The 155th Separate Armored Brigade (Heavy) is an asset of the Mississippi Army National Guard, and is an integral part of the Total Army Concept.
The first Annual Training period involving members of the 155th Separate Armored Brigade (Heavy) for 2001 took place when the unit participated in the 18th Airborne Corps Warfighter Exercise at Fort Campbell, KY, for the periods of 27 January-03 February and 27 February-11 March 2001.
The Adjutant General's Office of the Mississippi National Guard received an alert notification in May 2004 for the nearly 4,000 soldiers of the 155th Separate Armored Brigade (SAB), headquartered in Tupelo, Miss. The notification alerts the command of the brigade and its units to begin sensible planning and preparation for possible mobilization in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
I did much research and downloading today regarding Analytical Loss Prevention and Security.
Welcome to Haroldholme!
I look forward to sharing ideas and life with you.
Friday, June 18, 2004
Thursday, June 17, 2004
Got a new 2/198th AR Leadership Contact List today
I received a 2-198th AR Leadership Contact List from CSM Davis today
Wednesday, June 16, 2004
An Intitial Report from the 9/11 Commission issued today
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (or "9/11 Commission") issued the initial report of its findings. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was set up on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and Congress.
The Commission was instructed "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.
I want a copy!!!
The Commission was instructed "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.
I want a copy!!!
Modeling Loss Prevention Efforts, Some Deployment Notes, and the Baghdad Mosquito
I updated my Modeling Manual for ALPS. I wish to take all this with me, and Joann wanted a copy.
I received a Warning Order today that indicates that the 3rd ID will indeed be our Unit. I'm not going to include any of that Warning or OPORD for OPSEC reasons.
Some notes from COL Anderson regarding the upcoming Deployment:
Colonel Anderson:
1. Understand the cdr's intent during the fight, and understand the cdr's guidance during SASO. You can fight off of intent during combat, but not in SASO.
2. Fight the enemy, not the plan. The enemy over here chose to reach out much further from Baghdad in an attempt to disrupt our ops (Fedayeen, Al Quds, etc.); they were initially successful.
3. Battle drills work. We entered/cleared trenches, knocked out bunkers; and entered/cleared rooms. Don't get sexy - concentrate on the basics.
4. Casevac plans save lives. Allocate combat power to aid and litter teams; have/know the plan.
5. You have to be able to transition into the fight from an air assault and/or Ground Assault Convoy (GAC). You can't waste time adjusting to the new AO, getting folks up to speed, etc. on LZs, truck drop off pts, etc.
6. Watch soldier loads. MOLLEs make that tougher.
7. You will deal with the JRTC environment - Civilians on the battlefield, media on the battlefield and minefields. Fight as you have trained.
8. Standard weapons configuration and marksmanship remain one of our fundamentals. You have to be able to shoot under all conditions and hit what you shoot at.
9. PT remains the bedrock of our profession. It is tough to fight in 100+ degree weather for sustained periods of time. Being in shape helps with that process.
10. Understand MDMP. Not that any war will be the same, but FRAGOs on the hoodtop were the basic plans approach in this conflict. Time was of the essence in this op, and you have to understand the steps in your head so you can at least take all factors into consideration when there is no formal MDMP process. This was a task org/msn/intent/sketch war.
I began receiving the Baghdad Mosquito newsletter today.
I received a Warning Order today that indicates that the 3rd ID will indeed be our Unit. I'm not going to include any of that Warning or OPORD for OPSEC reasons.
Some notes from COL Anderson regarding the upcoming Deployment:
Colonel Anderson:
1. Understand the cdr's intent during the fight, and understand the cdr's guidance during SASO. You can fight off of intent during combat, but not in SASO.
2. Fight the enemy, not the plan. The enemy over here chose to reach out much further from Baghdad in an attempt to disrupt our ops (Fedayeen, Al Quds, etc.); they were initially successful.
3. Battle drills work. We entered/cleared trenches, knocked out bunkers; and entered/cleared rooms. Don't get sexy - concentrate on the basics.
4. Casevac plans save lives. Allocate combat power to aid and litter teams; have/know the plan.
5. You have to be able to transition into the fight from an air assault and/or Ground Assault Convoy (GAC). You can't waste time adjusting to the new AO, getting folks up to speed, etc. on LZs, truck drop off pts, etc.
6. Watch soldier loads. MOLLEs make that tougher.
7. You will deal with the JRTC environment - Civilians on the battlefield, media on the battlefield and minefields. Fight as you have trained.
8. Standard weapons configuration and marksmanship remain one of our fundamentals. You have to be able to shoot under all conditions and hit what you shoot at.
9. PT remains the bedrock of our profession. It is tough to fight in 100+ degree weather for sustained periods of time. Being in shape helps with that process.
10. Understand MDMP. Not that any war will be the same, but FRAGOs on the hoodtop were the basic plans approach in this conflict. Time was of the essence in this op, and you have to understand the steps in your head so you can at least take all factors into consideration when there is no formal MDMP process. This was a task org/msn/intent/sketch war.
I began receiving the Baghdad Mosquito newsletter today.
Tuesday, June 15, 2004
Monday, June 14, 2004
More Mob details, downloaded more TTP's and Manuals
I created another document trying to determine more details regarding our deployment. Here it is:
Probable MOB Date is now August 2, 2004. That backs the advance people up to the middle of July. We have AT 10 July through 17 July, so I can see us turning right around and Beginning 10% pre-MOB.
It is “99.99%” probable that we will MOB from Camp Atterbury, IN. It is also likely that we will spend two weeks at Ft. Irwin, CA, and will link up with the 11th ACR there. 2/11 ACR will provide all the heavy resources. That means that all maneuver units of the 155 will mobilize as motorized units. We will task organize once we know the mission. 2/11 ACR will remain at CTC to continue OPFOR function until we arrive for MRX.
SSG Campbell is to go to Senatobia Tuesday, 15 June 2004 to “scrub” the UMR for possible non-deployables. SSG Campbell also must create two new SRP jackets for the DEMOB Checklist and Deploy Checklists (what the unit has to provide prior to AT). We need to get potential Dental CL3 and CL4 people identified early in order to get funding – this could help head off some non-deployables, or at least give us early identification.
Lt. McLaurin is working with the Family Care Plans, and the Next Family Readiness Group meeting, which is to occur 26 June 2004, 0900, Dales Smokehouse in Batesville.
LTC Smith is conducting a site visit (with a team) to Camp Atterbury the week of 21 June 2004.
Looks like 1 Tank and 2 Tank may both “Carry the Flag”. Unknown at this time.
We’ve already given up our Hummers to support AT at Camp McCain. This leaves a couple of questions…How do we get the troops from Det 1 to McCain on 10 July.
Plans section will be participating in a CPX with 3 ID at Ft. Stewart (24-30 July). Right now they are calling for a work cell (plans and pucksters). BCBST: We will conduct the WFX but we are requesting to push back to mid-September while at Atterbury.
We need to break all of Det 1 into four categories:
Cat 1 - Those leaders down to squad/section level that will be mob'd early and go
to Atterbury to conduct all SRP/Ind. Training prior to main body mob.
Cat 2 - Soldiers requiring MOSQ or NCOES/OES
Cat 3 - Soldiers needed for mob prep (plan on 10%)
Cat 4 - remaining main body
We need this list ASAP
Around 28 July, we should have had our Connexes dropped at the units. We will bring in individuals to begin loading these through 2 August. I’m working on getting us a shrink-wrap machine.
Sounds like we'll go to Iraq with some or all the "Units of Action" or UA's (the Army's new org they've experimented with) from 3ID. Our Division, which will support OIF III may also include the 256 BDE (I believe they are a heavy mechanized infantry. brigade from Acadiana Louisiana, led by General John Basilica, placed on alert March 1, and should MOB at Fort Hood), two BDEs and an Engineer Company from 11ACR, us, and of course, the 3ID. 3ID was the vanguard unit that took Baghdad in record time last year, and redeployed from June through August of last year back to Fort Stewart, GA. They reorganized into Units of Action, and tested the concept at Fort Irwin earlier this spring.
Not sure where the 278th BDE out of TN and the 1BN, 509th INF out of Ft. Polk fit in.
I also understand that we will get a four-star General Officer in Theater, sometime after June 30, it could be Lt. General Sanchez, but that looks doubtful. More likely to be General George W. Casey. The idea is to have a four-star on hand to focus on the big picture (political issues while we hand over the government) and the Lt. General to run day-to-day combat issues.
The deployment of OIF 3 (that would be us)is expected to occur from September 2004 through February 2005, although the Marine Corp has already begun deploying.
As you probably know, Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) deactivated 15 May at Camp Victory (al-Faw Palace), Iraq, and two now commands were created, the Multi-National Force Iraq, and Multi-National Corps Iraq. Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez remained in command of U.S. Forces in Iraq, as the commander of MNFI. Lt. General Thomas F. Metz took command of MNCI.
The MNFI mission is to conduct strategic operations to defeat the remaining non-compliant forces and create a secure, creditable Iraq.
The MNCI mission is to fight the tactical war against the anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi forces.
I also downloaded more TTPs and Manuals
Probable MOB Date is now August 2, 2004. That backs the advance people up to the middle of July. We have AT 10 July through 17 July, so I can see us turning right around and Beginning 10% pre-MOB.
It is “99.99%” probable that we will MOB from Camp Atterbury, IN. It is also likely that we will spend two weeks at Ft. Irwin, CA, and will link up with the 11th ACR there. 2/11 ACR will provide all the heavy resources. That means that all maneuver units of the 155 will mobilize as motorized units. We will task organize once we know the mission. 2/11 ACR will remain at CTC to continue OPFOR function until we arrive for MRX.
SSG Campbell is to go to Senatobia Tuesday, 15 June 2004 to “scrub” the UMR for possible non-deployables. SSG Campbell also must create two new SRP jackets for the DEMOB Checklist and Deploy Checklists (what the unit has to provide prior to AT). We need to get potential Dental CL3 and CL4 people identified early in order to get funding – this could help head off some non-deployables, or at least give us early identification.
Lt. McLaurin is working with the Family Care Plans, and the Next Family Readiness Group meeting, which is to occur 26 June 2004, 0900, Dales Smokehouse in Batesville.
LTC Smith is conducting a site visit (with a team) to Camp Atterbury the week of 21 June 2004.
Looks like 1 Tank and 2 Tank may both “Carry the Flag”. Unknown at this time.
We’ve already given up our Hummers to support AT at Camp McCain. This leaves a couple of questions…How do we get the troops from Det 1 to McCain on 10 July.
Plans section will be participating in a CPX with 3 ID at Ft. Stewart (24-30 July). Right now they are calling for a work cell (plans and pucksters). BCBST: We will conduct the WFX but we are requesting to push back to mid-September while at Atterbury.
We need to break all of Det 1 into four categories:
Cat 1 - Those leaders down to squad/section level that will be mob'd early and go
to Atterbury to conduct all SRP/Ind. Training prior to main body mob.
Cat 2 - Soldiers requiring MOSQ or NCOES/OES
Cat 3 - Soldiers needed for mob prep (plan on 10%)
Cat 4 - remaining main body
We need this list ASAP
Around 28 July, we should have had our Connexes dropped at the units. We will bring in individuals to begin loading these through 2 August. I’m working on getting us a shrink-wrap machine.
Sounds like we'll go to Iraq with some or all the "Units of Action" or UA's (the Army's new org they've experimented with) from 3ID. Our Division, which will support OIF III may also include the 256 BDE (I believe they are a heavy mechanized infantry. brigade from Acadiana Louisiana, led by General John Basilica, placed on alert March 1, and should MOB at Fort Hood), two BDEs and an Engineer Company from 11ACR, us, and of course, the 3ID. 3ID was the vanguard unit that took Baghdad in record time last year, and redeployed from June through August of last year back to Fort Stewart, GA. They reorganized into Units of Action, and tested the concept at Fort Irwin earlier this spring.
Not sure where the 278th BDE out of TN and the 1BN, 509th INF out of Ft. Polk fit in.
I also understand that we will get a four-star General Officer in Theater, sometime after June 30, it could be Lt. General Sanchez, but that looks doubtful. More likely to be General George W. Casey. The idea is to have a four-star on hand to focus on the big picture (political issues while we hand over the government) and the Lt. General to run day-to-day combat issues.
The deployment of OIF 3 (that would be us)is expected to occur from September 2004 through February 2005, although the Marine Corp has already begun deploying.
As you probably know, Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) deactivated 15 May at Camp Victory (al-Faw Palace), Iraq, and two now commands were created, the Multi-National Force Iraq, and Multi-National Corps Iraq. Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez remained in command of U.S. Forces in Iraq, as the commander of MNFI. Lt. General Thomas F. Metz took command of MNCI.
The MNFI mission is to conduct strategic operations to defeat the remaining non-compliant forces and create a secure, creditable Iraq.
The MNCI mission is to fight the tactical war against the anti-coalition and anti-Iraqi forces.
I also downloaded more TTPs and Manuals
Sunday, June 13, 2004
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